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the biblical notion of creation lies at the very 
heart of levinas’ anthropology and metaphysics. 
he realises that the notion is totally ignored by 
modern philosophy, and he does not endeavour 
a discussion of the subject within the framework 
of philosophy. instead, he frequently engages 
in a polemic with the concept of creation which 
prevails in traditional christian theology. his 
perception of man as a created being, as well as 
his metaphysics as a whole, draws on desire rather 
than thought seeking to comprehend, or ontology; 
he demonstrates that modern scepticism, or 
post-modernism, opens a way to better see man 
as a created being. he argues that the notion 
of creation is far more closely related to the 
concept of separation that that of participation 
which pervades traditional theology, while man, 
as a created freedom, is atheistic by nature. the 
temporality of human life, on the other hand, is 
a relation to god. all the above mentioned strands 
of levinas’ thought, developed in a controversial 
way, may prove inspiring for modern theological 
reflection on creation. this inspiring and critical 
function of levinas’ philosophy is clearly visible 
against the background of Jürgen Moltmann’s 
theology and the theological project of Marc 
harris.
Biblijna idea stworzenia stanowi centrum antropo-
logii i całej metafizyki emmanuela levinasa. Wie 
on, że ta idea jest zupełnie pomijana przez współ-
czesną filozofię i nie usiłuje na ten temat w ramach 
filozofii dyskutować. natomiast wielokrotnie 
podejmuje polemikę z koncepcją stworzenia do-
minującą w tradycyjnej teologii chrześcijańskiej. 
swoje pojmowanie człowieka jako stworzenia 
wyprowadza, podobnie jak całą metafizykę, z pra-
gnienia, a nie myśli szukającej zrozumienia, czyli 
ontologii; wskazuje, że współczesny sceptycyzm, 
czyli postmodernizm, otwiera drogę do lepszego 
zobaczenia człowieka jako stworzenia. Pokazuje, 
że idea separacji o wiele lepiej koresponduje z ideą 
stworzenia, niż mocno obecna w tradycyjnej teo-
logii idea partycypacji, a człowiek, jako wolność 
stworzona, jest z natury ateistyczny. natomiast 
czasowość ludzkiego życia jest relacją z Bogiem. 
te kontrowersyjnie poprowadzone myśli levinasa 
mogą być inspirujące dla współczesnej teologicz-
nej refleksji nad stworzeniem. inspirującą i kry-
tyczną funkcję myśli levinasa wyraźnie widać 
w zestawieniu jej z teologią Jürgena Moltmanna 
oraz projektem teologicznym Marca harrisa.
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1. Introduction
emmanuel levinas’ thinking is rooted in the old testament, though at the 
same time it belongs to the european philosophy of 20th century. its double genesis 
is particularly visible in an analysis of (when one analyses) his concept of creation. 
the concept is clearly biblical in its nature and foreign to modern philosophy, 
yet it occupies a central position in levinas’ thought. 1 levinas is aware that the 
notion of creation is nowadays treated as a non-philosophical issue, and he does 
not attempt to rationally prove his stance. he simply accepts, together with the 
Bible, that man is a created being. neither is he seeking a common ground with 
other contemporary philosophies, although he repeatedly wonders when and why 
the european philosophy abandoned the idea of creation. at the same time, his 
reflection on creation is developed in opposition to the theological teaching based 
on the european philosophic tradition. 
there are no doubts that, to a large extent, levinas owes his idea of creation 
to F. rosenzweig. it is a fact acknowledged by levinas himself. 2 his general 
acknowledgement of his indebtedness to rosenzweig is particularly related to the 
idea of creation. a study of that relationship deserves a separate comprehensive 
research, which is not part of this article.
For the sake of clarity, it has to be stated that levinas is preoccupied with man. 
the world draws his interest insofar as it is a world where man lives. Being no 
infinity or transcendence, nor an ethical subject, the world in itself is of no interest 
to levinas. the world has obviously also been created, however, the analysis below 
pertains exclusively to man as a created being. 
it is not possible to present an exhaustive account of the idea in one article since, 
as has already been mentioned, it is one of the most significant ideas in levinas’ 
anthropology, and, together with other related ideas, it weaves through his entire 
work. therefore, in order to present the basic structure of his thought, this article 
will focus on a handful of basic notions which levinas employs when writing 
about creation: metaphysics, scepticism, separation, freedom and temporality. 
each of the above mentioned notions is significant for levinas’ entire thinking, so 
they will only be discussed insofar as it is necessary in order to present his idea of 
creation. in the discussion of the relevant notions, an emphasis will be placed on 
levinas’ disputes with the tradition of christian theology, while the general links 
1 in his article, Jeffrey hanson notes that the notion of creation ex nihilo is of crucial importance 
to levinas, yet it is relatively seldom found in his writings. he explains it pointing out that the notion 
is of theological nature, while levinas consistently claims that he is a philosopher, not a theologian. 
i would not totally agree with hanson. although the phrase “ex nihilo” is, indeed, a theological 
concept which rarely finds its way to levinas’ writings, the notion of “creation” is a biblical one, and 
it is ever present in his texts. see also footnote 7.
2 emmanuel levinas. 1969. Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. alphonso 
lingis (Pittsburgh: duquesne university Press) 32. hereafter this work will be referred to a ti. 
rosenzweig is “too often present in this book to be cited”. More on the subject: J. hanson, op. cit., 
footnote 2.
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of his thought with the main trends of 20th-century continental philosophy will not 
be analyzed: they have already been thoroughly studied, and they do not contribute 
significantly to the understanding of levinas’ idea of creation. 
the second part of this article will address the question asked in the title about 
the way in which levinas’ thought on creation may serve as ancilla theologiae. 
in that context, each of the relevant notions, metaphysics, scepticism, separation, 
freedom and temporality, will be discussed again. special emphasis will be placed 
on the potential use of levinas’ thought to better understand and describe the 
relationship between theology and modern sciences.
as part of summary, we will confront levinas’ thought on creation with Jürgen 
Moltmann’s and Marc harris’s theology.
2. Status Questionis
as has already been mentioned, the notion of creation is nowadays considered 
as a non-philosophical one. it is thus no wonder that philosophers commenting 
on levinas’ thought leave out his reflection on man as a created being. in 
a comprehensive article devoted to levinas in stanford encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy, and the attached bibliography of almost 300 titles, there is no discussion 
of the idea. a Jstor search has pointed to three relevant texts, which are briefly 
presented below.
the article “l’idée de création chez levinas : une archéologie du sens” by 
olmedo gaviria alvarez. 3 first presents levinas’ idea of creation and his references 
to religious traditions and the european philosophy. referring to those traditions, 
levinas wonders why modern philosophy has abandoned the idea. in the main 
body of the article, the author focuses on demonstrating that levinas’ idea of 
creation is not related to the question about the origin and purpose of man, but to the 
question of man’s actual relationship with god. the idea of creation points to the 
relationship with god as the source of meaning, and, since for levinas it is always 
an ethical relationship that becomes the source of meaning, the idea of creation 
as an actual relationship with god is inseparably linked to the description of an 
ethical relationship with another human being. in conclusion, the author claims 
that there is a close link between the idea of creation and the idea of brotherhood 
in levinas’ thinking. 
the article “schöpfung bei emmanuel levinas” by Joseph Wohlmuth 4 gives 
a general account of levinas’ idea of creation and then proceeds to an analysis 
of his thought from the perspective of german theology. it is a theology that is 
solidly founded on german idealism. that is probably the reason for the author’s 
introductory claim that the theology of creation has come to terms with the 
3 olmedo gaviria alvarez. 1974. L’idée de création chez Levinas: une archéologie du sens, 
”revue philosophique de louvain“, QuatriÈMe sÉrie, Vol. 72, no. 15: 509-538.
4 Josef Wohlmuth. 1992. Schöpfung bei Emmanuel Levinas, ”zeitschrift für katholische 
theologie“, n° 4: 408-426.
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problems posed by the development of modern science. 5 he compares levinas’ 
thought to J. Moltmann’s theology of creation and demonstrates its connection with 
the “theology after the holocaust”. he also undertakes a thorough analysis of the 
way in which levinas addresses the question of the creator god’s responsibility 
for the evil committed by people. 
“creature discomforts: levinas’ interpretation of creation Ex Nihilo”, 6 an 
article by Jeffrey hanson, is the latest study of the idea of creation in levinas’ work. 
the author indicates two purposes levinas seeks to accomplish by introducing 
the notion of creation ex nihilo. 7 First, it describes the condition of the ethical 
subject. it points to the absolute character of the ethical demand. if man is created 
ex nihilo, there is nothing prior to the ethical demand. secondly, levinas aims 
to “reconfirm the ex nihilo ethical subject in her singularity without reabsorbing 
her into a totality”. therefore, for levinas, the notion of creation is closely 
linked to that of separation. in the second part of his essay, hanson discusses 
the relationship between the notions of creation ex nihilo and paternity. the third 
part of the essay “examines the curious destiny of creation ex nihilo”. Whereas in 
the beginning of his career, levinas considers creation ex nihilo as “too passive 
to capture the sense of subjectivity”, in his later work, Otherwise than Being, 
“creation ex nihilo is singled out as the only idea that captures the radical passivity 
of the subject”. according to hanson, a growing emphasis on the passivity of the 
subject contributes to an increasing inconsistency in levinas’ thought: it seems to 
undermine the absolute primordiality of the ethical demand, which is so strongly 
stressed in Totality and Infinity. 
such relative lack of interest in levinas’ idea of creation is in sharp contrast 
with the general popularity of levinas’ thought among theologians. the topic of 
levinas vs christian theology has been raised many times in the past decades. 
a sound review of those publications, accompanied by a classification of various 
ways in which the relation between levinas and christian theology is perceived, 
has been provided by robyn horner in his text “on levinas’ gift to christian 
theology” 8. in 21th century alone, two books were published under the same title, 
“levinas and theology”, one by Michael Purcell in 2006, and the other by nigel 
5 almost thirty years later, it is difficult to accept such a statement. the mentality shaped 
by modern science increasingly dominates, calling for theology of creation that will address its 
demands.
6 hanson, Jeffrey. 2015. Creature Discomforts: Levinas’s Interpretation of Creation Ex Nihilo, 
in: Being-in-Creation: Human Responsibility in an Endangered World. Groundworks: Ecological 
Issues in Philosophy and Theology, edited by Brian treanor, Bruce ellis Benson, and norman 
Wirzba (new york: Fordham university Press) 113-127.
7 unlike hanson, i believe that levinas treats the notion of creation as a primary premise of his 
anthropology rather than a secondary concept resulting from his previous assumptions and the need 
to justify other ideas. it is a biblical concept, so for levinas it is prior to any philosophical notion. 
8 horner, robyn. On Levinasʹs Gifts to Christian Theology, in: The Exorbitant. Emmanuel 
Levinas Between Jews and Christians, ed. kevin hart and Michael a. singer. 2010. (Fortham 
university Press, new york) 120-149. the idea of creation does not make a significant appearance 
neither in horner’s text, nor in the entire volume.
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zimmermann in 2013, which demonstrates that the issue is still topical 9. neither of 
them raises the theme of creation in levinas’ work.
3. Metaphysics: a Desire Rather than Ontology
already the first sentence of the first subchapter devoted to the issue of creation 
exposes a controversy between levinas’ thought and classical theology: 
theology imprudently treats the idea of the relation between god and the 
creature in terms of ontology. 10
to comprehend that sentence, it is essential to remember levinas’ understanding 
of “ontology”, as he attributes a particular meaning to the notion. in line with the 
etymology of the word, he perceives ontology as any effort taken with the aim to 
comprehend being. ontology is a theory of being. levinas, therefore, links ontology 
with any form of cognition, or the process of defining being with concepts. For 
him, also the thought of heidegger belongs to the realm of ontology. Viewed from 
such a perspective, the whole philosophical tradition originating from socrates and 
called metaphysics by aristotle, becomes ontology for levinas. 11 he writes: 
Western philosophy has most often been an ontology: a reduction of the other 
to the same by interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the 
comprehension of being. 12
in his own specific way, levinas draws a clear distinction between ontology 
and metaphysics. it is the subject of the whole subchapter in the first part of 
Totality and Infinity, “Metaphysics Precedes ontology”. 13 While ontology is about 
comprehension, metaphysics is about desire and scepticism. a description of desire 
opens the first part of totality and infinity (18nn). desire comes first. Metaphysics 
emerges and persists because of the desire of the other that remains in us. “the 
other metaphysically desired is not “other” like the bread i eat, the land in which 
i dwell, ...the metaphysical desire tends toward something else entirely, toward the 
absolutely other.” 14 thus, metaphysical desire is not secondary to the knowledge 
or imagination of the object of desire. We also experience desires directed towards 
more or less specific objects, they can, however be satisfied; they are essentially 
desires for something that can be embraced, comprehended, absorbed, or made 
the same, and levinas usually refers to them as needs. let us, however, reiterate 
levinas’ fundamental thesis: in man, there is a desire that is prior to any idea of 
the object of desire. it goes beyond immanence: it is transcendence, metaphysics. 
9 Purcell, Michael. 2006. Levinas and Theology (cambridge university Press); zimmermann, 
nigel. 2013. Levinas and Theology (Bollmoburyt&t clark).
10 ti 296.
11 it has to be noted that the distinction between metaphysics and ontology made by levinas 
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since desire always comes first, prior to a subject, the impossibility to satisfy it 
is part of its very nature. therefore, any effort of ontology, any intellectual result 
of its work, is immediately contested as inadequate vis a vis the desire. the desire 
remains a continuous desire of the other, while any knowledge acquired via 
ontology becomes, ipso facto, the same. thus, ontological desire is closely linked 
to scepticism, which means challenging any description, system or intellectual 
construction built on the basis of ontology.
similarly to the primacy of desire, metaphysics precedes ontology. therefore, 
objecting to the description of the relationship between the creation and the creator 
in terms of ontology, levinas portrays it as a metaphysical relationship. in other 
words, if ontology is a movement of thought aiming at comprehension, then, 
according to levinas, the creator-creation relationship totally falls outside that 
movement; it is unsusceptible to comprehension or, to use levinas’ own words, 
it is anarchic. one can speak or write about it, invoke the fact of creation, capture 
it in intellectual constructs, the creation itself, however, remains indefinable, and, 
like desire, it belongs to the logics of the other. creation is only “comprehendible” 
in terms of metaphysics, not ontology. the word “comprehendible” has been put 
in inverted commas, as comprehension in its generally accepted meaning takes us 
almost automatically into the realm of ontology. 
the primacy of desire helps to place levinas’ anthropology in the context of 
the european philosophical tradition: man is primarily a free being rather than 
a rational being. to invoke major theological traditions: here levinas approaches 
augustine rather than aquinas. 
4. In praise of Scepticism
scepticism has already been mentioned in this article. in Proper names, his 
collection of essays, levinas discusses, inter alia, Voice and Phenomenon by derrida. 
that is where derrida levels his criticism at husserl’s belief in the possibility of an 
assumptionless description of reality, and where he develops his idea of deconstruction. 
the work is generally considered as a postmodernist manifesto. having presented 
derrida’s deconstruction project, filled with sheer delight at the act of destruction 
which derrida has performed on all the axioms of Western thought, levinas writes: 
it will be less readily recognized – derrida would probably refuse to do so – that 
this critique of being in its eternal presence of ideality allows us, for the first time 
in the history of West, to concieve of the being of the creature without resorting to 
the ontic narrative of e divine operation – without treating the „being” [„être”] of 
creature as a being [un éntant] from the outset, without bringing to bear negative 
and empirical concepts, such as contingency or „generation and corruption” – 
concepts as ontic as the incorruptibility of the Whole. For the first time, the „less 
being”, which is that of creature, is shown in its verbality of verb. 15
15 emmanuel levinas. 1987. Proper Names, trans. Michael B. smith (stanford, ca: stanford 
university Press, hors sujet, Montpellier: Fata Morgana) 60.
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as he notes earlier, levinas is fully aware that derrida and other 20th century 
philosophers will not be able to agree with him on this point, as the very idea of 
creation is foreign to them. thus, he is able to sympathise with postmodernism as 
far as the criticism of philosophical tradition, the act of destruction is concerned, 
however, the intellectual paths of levinas and the postmodernists totally split apart 
on the subject of “man as a created being”. 16 
the quoted passage demonstrates the importance of scepticism for levinas’ 
notion of creation: the scepticism that challenges the foundations of systematising 
Western thought, which he refers to as ontology. the thought, or ontology, is 
founded on the principle of the unity of being, formulated by Parmenides, developed 
by Plotinus and continued by spinoza and hegel. levinas writes that “multiplicity 
is taken to be the ontological fallenness of beings mutually limiting one another 
in their proximity. since Parmenides across Plotinus we have not succeeded in 
thinking otherwise”. 17 in an attempt to “think otherwise”, levinas follows Plato 
as he commits patricide on Parmenides, 18 challenging the principle of the unity 
of being, he rejects, however, the Platonic idea of the multiplicity of beings as 
fallenness. to levinas, multiplicity as the fundamental structure of beings is the 
result of creation rather than fall. Multiplicity as the fundamental structure of 
being precludes the possibility of synthesis and systematisation as the final effect 
of thinking. it calls for scepticism. 
5. Separation, not participation
since multiplicity is the fundamental structure of beings, one should not 
wonder that “separation” is one of the most important terms used by levinas to 
describe the relationship between the creator and the creation. it stands in clear 
opposition to the term “participation” introduced by Plato and embraced as part of 
the basic neoplatonic vocabulary. consequently, “participation” is one of the key 
terms in Western philosophy. augustine incorporated that philosophical notion 
in the christian idea of creation, and it thus pervaded latin theology. it is within 
the category of participation, with all the richness of its content provided by the 
Western philosophical tradition, that the classical theological description of the 
creator – creation relationship is placed. levinas radically rejects the philosophical 
idea of participation. 19 he claims that separation is “the ultimate structure 
16 that is how the work of levinas is perceived, i.a., by carl raschke. he presents levinas’ 
philosophy as one of the significant sources contributing to the construction of the post-modernist 
theory of religion. referring to levinas’ thought, he repeatedly juxtaposes it with that of derrida. 
raschke, carl. 2012. Postmodernism and the Revolution in Religious Theory. Toward a Semiotics 
od Event (university of Virginia Press) pp. 108-140. raschke does not refer to the idea of creation 
in his text. 
17 ti 108.
18 in Sophist, B257.
19 More on the subject: Jill robbins. 1999. Altered Reading: Levinas and Literature (chicago: 
university of chicago Press) 87-90. the author also stresses that levinas raises the question of 
participation primarily for polemical purposes. 
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of being”, 20 using the term also to describe the creator – creation relationship: 
“What is essential to created existence is its separation with regard to the infinite.” 21 
separation implies the existence of totally distinct beings. the relationship between 
the creator and the creation consists in separation. Both the creator and the creation, 
i.e. man, are infinite beings, and an infinite being cannot be limited. therefore, 
separation means that beings do not border on one another. their mutual relation 
does not consist in limitation, it is of a totally different nature. since separation 
is the fundamental structure of beings, metaphysical desire cannot be perceived 
as a pursuit of the lost and yet sought-after unity. unity is neither the beginning 
(arche), nor the final purpose, the ideal. the creation is a free, good work of god, 
and it is irreversible. desire is by no means an evidence of shortage or a void that 
has to be filled; it is not a need, but a desire for the good, while “the Place of the 
good above every essence is the most profound teaching, the definitive teaching, 
not of theology, but of philosophy.” 22
the desire for the good, “desire in its positivity is affirmed across the idea of 
creation ex nihilo”. 23 “creation ex nihilo breaks with system, posits a being outside 
of every system, that is, there where its freedom is possible”. 24 the relationship 
of creation leaves to the created being “a trace of dependence” on the creator, it 
is, however, only a trace rather than presence. therefore, it is a relationship that 
continues to be separation, a relationship that is exclusive and unique. From that 
dependence, which is expressed with the metaphor of a trace, the created being 
draws its independence, its exteriority to the system. separation is not simply 
a negation; it means distinctness and, at the same time, an openness to the infinite. 25
since man is infinity, the social relation is also a concrete manifestation of 
separation. it is of different nature than the relation to the creator insofar that it 
is not marked by the trace of dependence, yet its fundamental structure is that 
of separation. the social relation, which is first and foremost a relationship with 
another man, is known to be the leading theme of levinas’ thinking. it clearly 
demonstrates that the idea of creation, or the relationship between man and the 
creator, is of utmost significance for his entire thought. it has to be reiterated that 
the surrounding world, according to levinas, has no dimension of infinity; it is 
immanence, thus, the relation to the world has a totally different structure. 
6. Freedom of Creation, Created Freedom
to levinas, the notion of creation is closely linked to his belief in the authenticity 
of human freedom. Man is a created freedom: this sentence summarises levinas’ 






25 see ti 108.
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attaches a metaphysical dimension. he acknowledges the primary value and 
authenticity of freedom, but also its significant limitation. in Outside the Subject, 
levinas makes an effort to descend to the very depth of our humanity and freedom: 
he presents a comprehensive analysis of dependence, of the susceptibility of “i” 
and human freedom. in that depth, he finds a point where “i” becomes a mere 
“self”, an absolute passivity, which is a trace of being creature. 26 it is precisely 
because of its posteriority that freedom is the most relevant evidence that nan is 
a created being. it is autonomous, it is freedom and not its illusion, and at the 
same time it is limited. it is a freedom that has been created, bestowed. levinas 
likes to refer to the investiture of freedom. 27 this is where levinas introduces 
the motif of chosenness and the closely related responsibility which is prior to 
any decision; the responsibility which is not chosen and which cannot be avoided. 
that responsibility or chosenness makes man unique, irreplaceable, unable to hide 
in the crowd. thus, the thought on creation is at the same time a thought on the 
chosenness and uniqueness, on the exceptionality of a single human being. 
human freedom is rooted in the freedom of the creator, yet that rootedness 
does not mean participation. it is the autonomous freedom of a separated being. 
such an understanding of freedom leads levinas to a statement that man, i.e. the 
Will, is atheistic by nature. he devotes a whole subchapter to the subject. 28 this 
article only stresses that levinas’ claim about man’s atheism is closely related to 
the acknowledgement of the fact that man is a created being. the atheism is a plain 
consequence of the assumption that the creator -creation relationship consists in 
separation. such statements are in obvious contradiction to the entire christian 
tradition claiming that god dwells in the human soul. 
levinas strongly emphasises the transcendence of god. god is transcendence 
and infinity. the other man is transcendence and infinity. yet, the other man is 
a body, so we meet him, he reveals himself to us as a face. god, on the other 
hand, is not carnal, thus, we cannot meet him face to face. he is absent. We can 
only perceive his traces. his trace, however, is not explicit, it has no structure 
of a phenomenon, it is an enigma, a dilemma. similarly, the way god speaks to 
man has the nature of a trace, it is an enigma, a dilemma, while the revelation is 
“a blinking light”. 29 that is probably the reason why levinas does not essentially 
write about god himself: he acknowledges that nothing can be said about him 
directly. 
the freedom that is created, or bestowed, needs justification as, because it is 
not casa sui, it cannot find justification in itself. levinas demonstrates that the only 
justification of freedom is offered by the other, another man, who gives meaning 
to my freedom and legitimises it. such perception of freedom means, inter alia, 
26 emmanuel levinas. 1978. Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. alphonso lingis 
(dordrecht: kluwer academic Publishers) 195, Footnote 13. hereafter this work will be referred to 
a oBBe.
27 see ti 89-94.
28 atheism or the Will, ti 57-63.
29 see oBBe 154.
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a dispute with sartre’s existentialism, but also heidegger’s Geworfenheit. 30 
however, the dispute is only a consequence of levinas’ own original thought on 
human freedom as created freedom and man as created infinity. 
another important statement deals with the category of limit: if man is infinity, 
or transcendence, and infinity has no limits because of being transcendent, then 
the freedom of the other man is not the limit of my freedom. those freedoms do 
not border on each other, they do not limit each other, nor do they form a totality: 
“the i’s form no totality; there exists no privileged plane where these i’s could 
be grasped in their principle. there is an anarchy essential to multiplicity.” 31 the 
above implies that there is no common plane of history, no possibility to predict the 
future. here levinas is in fundamental discord with hegel and his vision of history 
as a logical process. 
7. Temporality of Creation
in the preface to Time and the Other, levinas asks a question “is time the 
very limitation of finite being or is it the relationship of finite being to god?” 
(levinas, time and the other, Preface, p.30). it is, in fact, a rhetorical question, 
and the answer is obvious to levinas since it underlies one of the main axes of his 
entire thought: time is the relation of finite being to god, it is thus evidence, an 
outstanding evidence, of our creaturehood. our relation with god is diachronic in 
its structure, since time as a fundamental way of man’s existence is our relation with 
god, or our religion. that relation is not intentional, nor does possess the structure 
of knowledge since knowledge implies the presentation of god as a subject of 
cognition, i.e. synchronicity. in his description of that relationship, levinas is 
also critical about the notion of eternity: god cannot be conceived as living in 
eternity, beyond time. such god would be “an abstract eternity and dead god.” 32 
the temporality and mortality of our lives are at the same time the self, passivity 
and susceptibility. those notions, which are of key significance in Otherwise than 
Being, touch the deepest depth of “i”, showing an openness towards the other who 
cannot be reduced to the same, or comprehended. that openness, as has already 
been mentioned, means responsibility which cannot be avoided, irreplaceability.
the reflection on time as a relation of man to god demonstrates most clearly 
that levinas develops his thought in opposition to the entire philosophical, and, 
consequently, theological tradition which perceives time as secondary to eternity, 
a sign of fallenness, an accidental property. according to levinas, time is not 
a degradation of eternity, but the relation to the infinite. 33
30 see ti 307.
31 ti 298.
32 emmanuel levinas. 1987. Time and the Other, trans. richard a. cohen (Pittsburgh: 
duquesne university Press) 31. hereafter this work will be referred to a to.
33 see to 32.
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let us conclude this part of the article with an almost obvious statement: in his 
analyses of time, levinas draws heavily from heidegger. 34 however, his perception 
of man as a created being makes his perspective fundamentally different from 
heidegger’s, to which he himself refers in a very brief manner. heidegger thinks 
time on the basis of death, while levinas thinks death on the basis of time. 35 such 
an order of thinking results from his acknowledgement of the absolute primacy 
of a diachronic relation to the creator. in a similar way, levinas and heidegger 
differ while reflecting on the nature of human freedom. here also, levinas does 
not complete heidegger’s philosophy with an additional paragraph about man as 
a created being, but he demonstrates that the recognition of man’s creaturehood 
lends depth to that philosophy, setting it on a solid foundation. 
8. Theological perspective
in his comment on derrida’s work, levinas argues that post-modernist 
scepticism does not necessarily have to be identical with nihilism, on the contrary, 
it can be combined with the recognition of god, man’s creator. theology, 
therefore, does not have to reject post-modernism. it may use it as a tool to criticise 
those modernist trends which it finds contrary to the message of the gospel, or to 
validate the solidity of its own intellectual foundations. 
the reading of levinas encourages such a critical look at the long tradition of 
symbiosis between theology and the philosophical tradition originating from Plato 
and aristotle – a symbiosis which has resulted in ontotheology. it is particularly 
significant for the subject discussed in this article: levinas demonstrates that 
theology can – and should – reacknowledge the biblical notion of “creation” as 
absolutely primary, while all others, taken from philosophical traditions, should 
be treated as temporary annotations which can – and should – be abandoned 
when they cease to help us understand the biblical word “creation.” that reflection 
suggest a return to the biblical language as the primary and fundamental tool in the 
theological narrative on creation. the imagery and ambiguousness, or sometimes 
enigmaticness of that language are in fact its strength and the sign of perfection. 
the language of philosophy is of ancillary nature, thus, it should not claim any right 
to superiority. the above refers to the whole entirety of categories and systems 
developed by our philosophical tradition. 
on the other hand, it is clearly visible that the christian teaching on creation 
is now struggling with a mentality shaped by the domination of modern 
science, while the incredible development of technology seems to reaffirm the 
predominance of the scientific paradigm. the scientific explanations of how the 
34 anyone who reads levinas’ text will frequently come across passages where he acknowledges 
his philosophical indebtedness to heidegger, at the same time expressing his disappointment at the 
involvement of the latter on the side of the nazi regime. 
35 emmanuel levinas. 2000. God, Death, and Time, trans. Bettina Bergo, preface by Jacques 
rolland (stanford, ca: stanford university Press) see 106.
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world and man have emerged and how they function are accepted as intellectually 
obvious: the universe is described by physics and the related cosmology, the origin 
of man – by the theory of evolution, while human consciousness is regarded as an 
effect of electrical impulses within our cerebral convolutions. even though such 
explanations contain numerous gaps, also of fundamental nature, they seem to 
form a coherent whole, and they prove to be strong enough to totally dominate the 
intellects of modern people, especially well-educated inhabitants of the Western 
world. thus, the polemics theology endeavours within the limits designated by the 
scientific mentality and paradigm are predominantly hopeless. 
traditional theological teaching on creation, which is based on ontology, is 
unable to step beyond the above mentioned paradigm. its perception of creation 
within the categories of causality and purpose almost unavoidably pushes it towards 
the paradigm of modern sciences. even though causality in classical metaphysics 
is not identical with the causality defined by modern sciences, the similarity of 
notions and the related images leads to a very strong superimposition of meanings, 
and it takes a significant effort to unravel the resulting misunderstandings, which 
cannot be fully avoided, anyway. 
a different path has been taken by biblical fundamentalism, mainly in the 
united states. it strives to adjust to the modern scientific paradigm and defend the 
truth on creation from within (e.g. the notion of creation linked to the intelligent 
design theory).
Both the paths described above seem to lead nowhere. and since fides quaerens 
intellectum, faith which is not supported by intellect degenerates, becomes mere 
fideism and loses its vitality. to what extent can levinas’ thinking help us avoid 
such traps? the essential elements of his thinking include a close link between 
the notion of creation and anthropology, a stress on humanity as infinity, which 
implies defending humanity against any reduction, particularly the reduction 
of humanity by the paradigm of modern science. levinas’ thought refers to our 
innermost experience, treating it seriously and with trust, and taking it beyond 
the diktat of modern sciences. it reaffirms that the knowledge of the latter is of 
secondary, external nature, belonging to the realm of the same, the objective, 
by its very essence. levinas, therefore, helps to restore intellectual weight to the 
biblical categories. their pre-scientific nature, which is a most serious charge in 
the view of the modern scientific mentality, is presented as intellectual wisdom 
which, in relation to man and humanity, is prior and superior to any scientific 
rationality. it makes it possible for man to perceive himself as a created being in the 
biblical categories, without a compulsive need for apology so as to reconcile that 
thinking with the paradigm of modern science.
thus, with a circular, hermeneutic movement, our thought makes a long journey 
through ontology back to the scriptures. it is by no means a return to naivete, or 
rejection of what has been achieved during that long journey: on the contrary, 
the journey has enabled a deeper spiritual understanding of the biblical message. 
the word “spiritual” does not mean anything inferior to what is rational: it can be 
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perceived as a higher and deeper form of rationality, a way of thinking fit for our 
humanity that understands its own creaturehood, from which it draws the strength 
to live in a human way.
What considerably differs levinas’ thinking from traditional christian 
theology is the notion of separation. christian tradition puts a strong emphasis on 
god dwelling in the human soul, it is keen to describe the community of god and 
man as a parallel to the inter-human community, it knows the notion of theosis. 
augustine begins his Confessions with the famous sentence “our heart is restless, 
until it repose in thee”.
levinas has a different perception: the dependence of the creation upon its 
creator is only a trace which presumes the creator’s absence. desire, which is the 
foundation of metaphysics, is not a desire for god, no matter how we understand 
him, it is a desire without a correlate. levinas does not know augustine’s “reposing 
in god”, he only knows a trace of the creator. What is more, that “weak” metaphor 
of a trace and the concept of separation are for him a warrant of the reality of 
human freedom. it is from the concept of separation that he develops his reflection 
on atheism. 36 
levinas draws his idea of creation from the old testament, and as a philosopher 
and a Jew, he does not recognise the revelation in Jesus christ. he knows the 
new testament, and he occasionally quotes the gospels, however he treats them 
as a human text, while in Jesus he sees one of the Jewish teachers. christian faith 
and theology, on the other hand, are founded on the belief in Jesus christ, the 
son of god. yet, it seems that also that aspect of levinas’ thought – the idea of 
the absence of god – may provide an inspiration for christian theology. it might 
serve as a point of reference in the reflection aiming to cleanse theology from some 
overly anthropomorphic and simplifying perception of the community with god 
and god’s dwelling in the human soul. 
What also seems inspiring for christian theology is the link between the notion 
of creation and time, and the entire levinas’ reflection on time as the relation of 
the creation to the creator. even though that relation is described as a trace, which 
implies looking back, it is a relation that is diachronic and anarchic by its nature 
and is happening now. levinas refers to it as an intrigue in which infinity engages 
with man: „one is tempted to call this plot (fr.: intrigue) religious; it is not stated 
in terms of certainty or uncertainty, and does not rest on any positive theology.” 37
9. Two Confrontations: J. Moltmann i M. Harris
the juxtaposition of levinas’ thought with christian theology in its entirety 
seems to be a good starting point for more specific confrontations. therefore, we 
36 levinas’ approach to atheism, which is closely linked to his notion of creation, could be, in 
my opinion, as inspiring for christian theology as the idea of creation discussed in this article.
37 oBBe 147.
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will now try to confront his ideas with the reflection on creation by two christian 
theologians, Jürgen Moltmann 38 and Marc harris.
Moltmann presented his theology of creation in a series of lectures which were 
then published in a book “god in creation : an ecological doctrine of creation: 
the gifford lectures 1984-1985” 39. in order to understand the theological and 
philosophical context of his thought, one has to bear in mind that Moltmann 
represents Protestant theology, solidly based on the scriptures. on the philosophical 
side, he is deeply seated in the tradition of german idealism which draws from 
hegel. his theology of creation is generally classified as a variety of pantheism 40. 
Moltmann’s book devoted to the theology of creation was published in 1985, thus 
after the publication of the main body of levinas’ work 41. as he declares in the 
introduction, his aim is to renew the theology of creation, which is necessary in the 
context of new threats and challenges. he writes:
in the 1930s, the problem of the doctrine of creation was knowledge of god. 
today the problem of the doctrine of god is knowledge of creation. the 
theological adversary then was the religious and political ideology of ‘blood 
and soil’, ‘race and nation’. today the theological adversary is the nihilism 
practised in our dealings with nature. Both perversions have been evoked by 
the unnatural will to power, and the inhumane struggle for domination on 
earth. the inhumanity of this power complex and its perversion manifests the 
godlessness of our modern world and its terrifying godforsakenness. 42
to address the above described threats, Moltmann tries demonstrate anew 
the living presence of god in creation. his thought is theology – it is based on 
the christian faith in the holy trinity: the Father, the son and the holy spirit. it 
presents the whole world as a place where the holy spirit is active. 
levinas and Moltmann share a similar idea: the notion of creation is opposed 
to the reductions which modern mentality, including modern science, cause in our 
thinking about the world. their perceptions of creation, however, are radically 
different. Moltmann starts from the world in which we live. he is convinced that 
a renewed perception of the world, or the perception of the world as god’s creation 
permeated by the presence of the spirit, is a necessary starting point for an escape 
from the growing nihilism. 
38 as has already been mentioned, such juxtaposition was presented by J. Wolmuth, however, 
he focused on the interpretations of the notion “creatio ex nihilo”. We have adopted an entirely 
different perspective. 
39 Moltmann, Jürgen. 1985. God in creation: an ecological doctrine of creation: the Gifford 
lectures 1984-1985, trans. Margaret kohl from the german gott in der schöpfung: ökologische 
schöpfungslehre published by christian kaiser Verlag, Munich, 1985. translation © scM Press 
ltd.
40 see culp, John, “Panentheism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (summer 2020 
edition), edward n. zalta (ed.), url = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/ 
panentheism/>.
41 in his reflection, Moltmann consciously draws from the Jewish thought (see his declaration 
on p. xiii), however, he never refers to levinas.
42 Preface, s. xi-xii.
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For levinas, the surrounding world is immanence which tells him nothing 
about god. only human being is transcendence and reveals god. thus, his 
thinking on creation focuses exclusively on man as created being. it is the Face of 
the neighbour and its ethical call that provide the point of departure. in that call, 
man recognises the neighbour and himself as created beings. For levinas, the idea 
of man as created being is prior to the idea of god. the ethical agitation provoked 
by the face of the neighbour may then provide a stimulus for ethical reflection on 
the surrounding world and the perception of the world as god’s creation. levinas 
does not take that step, but he obviously does not preclude it.
the two ideas of creation described above seem to be complementary rather than 
mutually exclusive. What brings them together is their opposition to nihilism 43. it 
is also interesting to analyse those two ways of thinking from the perspective of 
the year 2020, when the concerns expressed by levinas and Moltmann have been 
largely substantiated: the technocratic paradigm is growing in dominance, strongly 
determining man’s thinking of himself, while practical nihilism seems widespread. 
in my opinion, levinas’ thought shows more robustness today compared to 
that of Moltmann. the ethical experience, the call of the face of the neighbour 
are the only foothold for reflection on man and the whole world as creation. 
a renewed ethical perception of the world, seeing the world as god’s creation, 
needs to be based on a renewed ethical perception of man as god’s creation. the 
way in the opposite direction is, in my opinion, closed today. 
as has already been mentioned, Moltmann’s thinking on creation belongs to 
the realm of christian theology. Moltmann thus assumes that seeing the world as 
god’s creation is pre-conditioned by faith in god, the holy trinity. levinas’ idea 
of creation, on the other hand, is a philosophical idea, which he himself stresses 
repeatedly. it is not based on the prior faith in god, it is a primary anthropological 
concept. From my perspective of a christian theologian, i admit that it is levinas’ 
idea rather than Moltmann’s theology that effectively opens a space for dialogue. 
Following the tracks of levinas’ thinking, it is possible to engage in a dialogue 
on man as a created being also with those who do not believe in one god in 
three Persons. such a dialogue may create a strong basis for a shared concern 
about ecology, that is the world where man lives. therefore, referring to the text by 
r. horner, we may claim that levinas’ idea of creation is also his gift to christian 
theology. 
Marc harris is the other theologian whose idea of creation we want to briefly 
confront with levinas’ thinking. his theological project is one of the latest and the 
most interesting attempts at the theological description of creation. concerning his 
assumptions and research goals, he writes: „the genesis creation stories provide 
an obvious example, and even now, more than 150 years after darwin’s origin 
43 levinas rarely refers to nihilism, however, he reiterates that his thinking is an objection 
against the dominance of neutrality, e.g. Against the Philosophy of the Neuter, ti pp. 301-303.
33Levinas’ interpretation of Creation versus Christian theoLogy
of species, controversy still rages over how they are best understood theologically 
in the light of modern science.” 44
the above quoted sentence points to the paradigm wherein M. harris intends to 
develop his theological reflection on creation: it is the paradigm of modern science. 
harris’s intention is to search for the traces of creation using the latest results of 
scientific research. From the perspective of levinas’ reflection, it means circulating 
within immanence i.e. outside humanity 45. levinas’ claim that modern science 
moves in the world devoid of human traces is in fact a claim that, by its very nature, 
science is blind to transcendence. as has already been pointed out, levinas’ notion 
of creation is essentially identical with that of separation, i.e. transcendence: the 
traces of creation can be seen in another human being, or in relation with another 
human being (the intrigue of the infinity), thus in transcendence. immanence, 
according to levinas, bears no significant traces of creation. 
seen from such a perspective, harris’s intention to search for the traces of 
creation taking modern science as a starting point is clearly doomed to failure. 
no matter how cautiously he might move in his search and reflection, no matter 
how much respect he might show to each sentence of the Bible, each phrase of 
the biblical description of creation, his prior assumption, searching „in the light 
of modern science”, leaves him within immanence, and any trace which he might 
recognize as a trace of creation is but a false clue. 
the perception of harris’s theological project from the perspective of levins’s 
thought reveals a deep conflict: the conflict of two rationalities. it is a conflict 
where no compromise is possible. let us iterate the fundamental assumptions of 
each side of the conflict in order to present its nature in the clearest possible way:
harris’s theological project in its entirety is placed within the rationality of 
modern science. it is a rationality which does not acknowledge anything above 
itself. For anything that is outside, it grants temporary legitimacy, in patient 
anticipation of the moment when it will be able to include and explain it. in other 
words, that rationality is convinced that eventually it will be able to embrace the 
entire reality. 
in his text A Rupture of Immanence 46, levinas demonstrates that modern 
science remains within immanence. the subsequent part of the book points out 
that immanence can be only broken by another rationality, new or the oldest 47. 
What is more, according to levinas, it is impossible to pass from the rationality of 
44 https://www.ed.ac.uk/profile/dr-mark-harris.
45 referring to modern science, levinas wrote: „contemporary thought thus moves in a world of 
being without human traces, where subjectivity has lost its place in the midst of spiritual landscape 
comparable to the one before the astronauts who first set foot on the moon, whence the earth itself 
appeared as a dehumanised star.” (ogcM p.7).
46 the first part of ogcM, pp 1-54.
47 ogcM pp. 106-107: „a new rationality – unless this be the oldest rationality, prior to the 
one that coincides with the possibility of the world – which consequently is not brought back to 
ontology. a different – or deeper – rationality and one that not allow itself to be led into adventure 
that, from aristotle to heidegger, theology ran when it remained a thought of identity and Being 
which was fatal to the god and to the man of the Bible, or to their homonymous.”
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modern science to that “new-older” rationality. it is necessary to think differently 
from the very beginning, and start one’s thinking beyond being. a powerful 
evidence of such thinking is provided in levinas’ book Otherwise than Being or 
Beyond Essence. 
at the same time, it is obvious that the two rationalities cannot exist alongside, 
in parallel. thus, there can be no compromise: it is either modern science, or the 
other rationality described by levinas that is the ultimate rationality. a solution 
of the dilemma is of key importance for anyone who pursues theology, as the 
nature of theology consists in reflecting on transcendence. Presenting his project 
of theological research, M. harris states that „the creationist agenda has tended to 
dominate the debate”. he is absolutely right: the question about creation is now the 
realm of probably the most significant theological controversy, where not only the 
issue of creation as one of the many theological questions is at stake, but the very 
nature and paradigm of theology itself.
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